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RESUMEN
A mediados de los 80 muchos países europeos liberalizaron los contratos temporales con objeto de
abaratar la contratación, en lugar de reducir los costes de despido de los contratos indefinidos. Ello
generó mercados laborales segmentados, siendo el caso español el más destacado, con una tasa
de temporalidad del 33% a mediados de los 90. Desde entonces se han propuesto varias reformas,
algunas de las cuales se cuantifican en este trabajo. Para ello, construimos un modelo de creación
y destrucción de empleo de búsqueda y emparejamiento capaz de replicar las propiedades del
mercado laboral español. A continuación, cuantificamos los efectos de la eliminación de los salarios
de tramitación y de una reducción aún más drástica de los costes de despido. Los resultados son:
(i) un incremento leve de la tasa de destrucción permanente, (ii) una reducción significativa de la
tasa de temporalidad debido al incremento de la conversión de contratos temporales en
permanentes, y (iii) una significativa reducción de la segmentación medida a través de la reducción
del gap salarial. 
Palabras clave: Costes de despido; tasa de temporalidad; destrucción de empleo; mercados
segmentados; creación de empleo.
JEL classificación: E24,J63,J42,J32,J23.
ABSTRACT
In the mid 80’s, many European countries liberalized the use of fixed-term  contracts in order to
lower firm’s non-wage labor costs, instead of reducing firing costs associated with indefinite
duration contracts. This policy generated segmented labor markets, being the Spanish case the
most  striking with a share of temporary employment of 33% by mid 90’s. Ever since, several
reforms have been proposed and in this paper we quantify the effects of some of them. First, we
build a model of job creation and destruction of the search and matching type that is able to
replicate the main properties of a segmented labor market like the Spanish one. Then, we use this
model to quantify the effects of eliminating procedural wages and further reducing firing costs
associated with permanent contracts. The main results are: (i) a small increase on permanent job
destruction, (ii) a significant reduction of temporary job destruction, mainly driven by the increase
in job conversions from temporary contracts into permanent ones, and (iii) a significant reduction
in labor market segmentation measured as the reduction in the wage gap of temporary versus
permanent ones.
Keywords: Firing costs; Temporary Employment; Job destruction; Job conversions;
Segmented labor markets; job creation.
JEL classification: E24,J63,J42,J32,J23.
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1 Introduction
In the mid 80’s, many European countries liberalized the use of ﬁxed-term (temporary) con-
tracts in order to lower ﬁrm’s non-wage labor costs, instead of reducing ﬁring costs associated
with indeﬁnite duration (permanent) contracts. This policy generated segmented labor mar-
kets, being the Spanish case the most striking with a share of temporary employment of 33%
by mid 90’s. Ever since, several reforms have been proposed and in this paper we quantify
the eﬀects of some of them. First, we build a model of job creation and destruction of the
search and matching type that is able to replicate the main properties of a segmented labor
market like the Spanish one. Then, we use this model to quantify the eﬀects of eliminating
procedural wages and further reducing ﬁring costs associated with permanent contracts. We
are particularly interested in the eﬀects on job creation (JC) and job destruction (JD), the
temporary employment rate and the conversion of temporary contracts (TC’s) into perma-
nent contracts (PC’s).
There is a debate about the link between employment protection legislation (EPL) and
job reallocation (JR)1. One of the main conclusions drawn from the theoretical literature is
that higher ﬁring costs negatively aﬀect JC and JD. Economies with lower dismissal costs
are considered more eﬃcient in the sense that they are more able to adapt to new conditions.
On the contrary, high ﬁring costs prevent the necessary reallocation from taking place and,
since entry into unemployment is as a consequence reduced, there is less exit, which means
less JC. However, when we look at JR across countries with diﬀerent degrees of employment
protection, there does not seem to be signiﬁcant diﬀerences (see Garibaldi, Konings, and
Pissarides (1996), OECD (1994), OECD (1996), OECD (1999)). This apparently contradic-
tion with what the theory would predict does not mean that EPL is irrelevant for JC and
JD. As argued in Bertola and Rogerson (1997), this might be due to the lack of quality of
the data or to the existence of other institutions that counteract the negative eﬀects of ﬁring
costs on job turnover. Therefore, all else being equal, EPL should negatively aﬀect JR.
1Job reallocation is deﬁned as the sum of job creation and job destruction.
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In this sense, the Spanish labor market is a very interesting case of study because of its
remarkably dual character, which allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of EPL per se from
the eﬀects of EPL when interacted with other institutions by exploiting within country
variation2. Since the liberalization of temporary contracts in 1984, the temporary job’s
share in hiring has increased from 12% to 96% in the mid 90’s, and the share of the stock
from 11% to 34%3. Most TC’s do not entail dismissal costs or they are very low. This,
together with the high ﬁring costs that protect PC’s has generated a segmented labor market,
which may appear quite dynamic just by looking at aggregate rates of JC and JD, but this
might be misleading. On the one hand, ﬁrms ﬁre permanent workers less than it would be
eﬃcient (labor hoarding) and very rarely hire on a permanent basis and, on the other hand,
temporary workers suﬀer the main adjustments. Table 1 shows averages of JC and JD rates
disaggregated by type of contract and ﬁrm size (less or equal than 200 employees or more
than 200) for the period 1990-96, which is the period of reference in this paper4. Most JR
is driven by the behavior of temporary employment, which is evidence of the relevance of
dismissal costs.
Table 1: Job creation and Job destruction.
Job creation Job destruction
> 200 - ≤ 200 > 200 - ≤ 200
Aggregate Employment [3.3 - 4.7] [6.3 - 9.9]
Permanent Employment [2.9 - 5.1] [5.7 - 9.7]
Temporary Employment [17.9 - 19.3] [22.3 - 28.0]
2It is diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀects of EPL from those of other institutional features. Most studies
carrying cross country pairwise correlations between EPL and several labor market variables suﬀer from this
drawback.
3Other European countries have also experienced increases in the share of temporary employment as a
result of the liberalization of TC’s in the mid 80’s, but not that high as in Spain
4These numbers have been taken from Ruano (2000) who uses the survey ”Encuesta de Estrategias
Empresariales”, a ﬁrm level data survey covering the period 1990-97.
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The Spanish experience has shown the ineﬃciency of doing reforms at the margin and the
need of ﬁghting against the real problem: the high ﬁring costs associated to PC’s. Starting
in 1994 there have been several reforms towards reducing temporary employment. Most
of them have proved to be insuﬃcient, being the most successful those that reduced non-
wage labor costs, i.e. ﬁring costs and social security contributions in 1997 and 2001. The
last reform took place in May 2002 by means of a decree ”Real Decreto-Ley 5/2002” that,
among other things, eliminated procedural wages. However, in September 2002 the reform
was revoked. In this paper we want to quantify what would have been the eﬀects had the
government not revoked the decree ”Real Decreto-Ley 5/2002” that eliminated procedural
wages.
For that purpose, we build a equilibrium model, similar in spirit to the job creation
and destruction model proposed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and introduce some
elements to capture the speciﬁcs of the Spanish labor market: (i) the existence of a Segmented
Labor Market with two types of jobs (permanent and temporary), diﬀering in the maximum
duration of the contract and in the associated ﬁring costs, and held by homogeneous workers;
(ii) endogenous job conversion of TC’s into PC’s; (iii) ﬁring costs modelled as a transfer from
the ﬁrm to the worker, and being a function of tenure and past wages approximated by past
match quality; and (iv) downward wage rigidities, so that ﬁring costs have real eﬀects5.I n
this labor market ﬁrms will be heterogeneous agents and will use these two types of contracts
to endogenously adjust their employment levels when facing idiosyncratic persistent shocks.
We follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by assuming one-job ﬁrms.
Before going into the details of the model, it is convenient to explain the timing and
agent’s decisions. At the beginning of the period, idiosyncratic shocks aﬀecting ﬁrms are
revealed. Then, ﬁrms and workers renegotiate wages. Given new wages, each ﬁrm with a
5Lazear (1990) notes that if contracts were perfect, severance payments would be neutral. If the govern-
ment forced employers to make payments to workers due to dismissal, perfect contracts would undo those
transfers by specifying opposite payments from workers to employers. In order for severance payments to
have any eﬀect, some form of incompleteness has to be introduced. Most studies have avoided this problem
by modelling dismissal costs as ﬁring taxes, so that the eﬀects cannot be undone by private arrangements.
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PC decides whether to ﬁre its actual worker, taking into account that ﬁring costs depend
on previous match quality. Firms with temporary workers take a similar decision. However,
ﬁrms whose TC’s cannot be renewed anymore6, decide at the beginning of this period whether
to convert or not the TC into a PC, taking into account the consequences regarding future
ﬁring costs. Once all these decisions have been made, production starts both, in ﬁrms where
workers have not been ﬁred this period and in those that were matched with unemployed
workers at the end of last period. Finally, search decisions are made: ﬁrms post vacancies
and unemployed workers apply for jobs. This search process will generate new matches that
will be productive next period. We will also assume that every job is created as a temporary
job.
The model is calibrated to the Spanish economy and we test its validity to replicate the
main labor market statistics. Then, we quantify the eﬀects of the elimination of procedural
wages, i.e. a 17% reduction in ﬁring costs, on the magnitude of temporary and permanent
job destruction, temporary employment, job conversion, unemployment, unemployment du-
ration, and on the distributions of tenure, wages and job separations. The main predictions
of this exercise are (i) a small increase on permanent job destruction, (ii) a signiﬁcant re-
duction of temporary job destruction mainly driven by the increase in job conversions, and
(iii) a signiﬁcant reduction in labor market segmentation measured as the reduction in the
wage gap of temporary versus permanent workers.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy present the institutional
background. In Section 3, we review previous literature. In Section 4, we present the model.
In Section 5, we discuss its calibration. In Section 6, we show simulation results from the
calibration exercise and from the reduction in ﬁring costs. In Section 7, we present some
robustness exercises regarding the minimum wage constraint. And ﬁnally, Section 8 draws
some conclusions.
6We will assume that the maximum number renewals is 2, so that TC’s can last at most 3 periods and
we will keep track of contract duration.
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2 Institutional background
In 1984 TC’s were liberalized and since then, ﬁrms have made widespread use of them.
There are two reasons for that behavior. First, they allow employment adjustments at a low
cost. Second, until 1994, ﬁrms could freely use TC’s without having to justify the temporary
nature of the activity, using the so called ”temporary employment promotion contract”. The
introduction of these cheap contracts, joint with the high ﬁring costs associated to PC’s, has
generated a dual labor market, where workers in PC’s have a very low probability of being
ﬁred while temporary workers suﬀer the main adjustments.
This experienced has shown the ineﬃciency of doing reforms at the margin and the need of
ﬁghting against the real problem: the high ﬁring costs associated to PC’s. From 1994 onwards
there have been several reforms in that direction. In 1994, the government eliminated the
”temporary employment promotion contract” and conditions for fair dismissals were slightly
relaxed. This reform did not decrease temporary employment because ﬁrms used other types
of TC’s to continue hiring people on a temporary basis.
In 1997, the government introduced the so called ”permanent employment promotion
contract”. This new PC was heavily subsidized and entitled to lower ﬁring costs (33 days’
wages per year of seniority with a maximum of 24 monthly wages) than ordinary PC’s (45
days’ wages per year of seniority with a maximum of 42 monthly wages) in case of unfair
dismissal. This reform was so successful (see Dolado, Jimeno, and Garc´ ia-Serrano (2002)
and Hernanz, Jimeno, and Kluger (2003)), that in 2001 the government extended the new
PC to more population groups, increased the subsidies and subsidized the conversion of TC’s
into PC’s.
In May 2003, the decree ”Real Decreto-Ley 5/2002” eliminated procedural wages, which
are those wages that ﬁrms have to pay upon dismissal until it is declared unfair or null.
However, in September 2002, the government got cold feet and restored them. Procedural
wages have till now been very relevant because most dismissals have been sued to court and
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declared unfair. According to Bentolila (1997), from those sued in 1996, 79% were agreed at
the Units of Intermediation (MAC’s), while the rest, 21%, were left to the judge; however,
only 15% of them were ﬁnally judged. From those, 72% were favorable to the worker.
Bentolila (1997) explains that, the high probability of a dismissal being sued is due to the
rational answer to legal incentives. Traditionally, ﬁrms have argued “disciplinary reasons”7
(while, in fact, the reasons were in most cases of “economic nature”), for several reasons:
(i) there was no need to give a notice period, (ii) the economic reasons were very diﬃcult
to prove, and (iii) because if ﬁnally sued, there was a positive probability of the dismissal
being declared fair. The worker also had incentives to sue the disciplinary dismissal, since
agreement conveyed no severance payment and no unemployment subsidy. Even in case
of a dismissal for objective reasons, the worker had always incentives to sue because (i)
there was a rebate in the income tax that could only be applied if there was disagreement,
(ii) severance payments were higher if the dismissal was declared unfair, and (iii) because
consultancy costs were usually paid by unions. In addition, workers knew the proportion of
cases that were usually declared favorable to the worker, as well as the high probability of
being oﬀered a reasonable indemnity before going to court.
3 Related literature
The pioneer empirical studies in the literature of job ﬂows are due to Davis and Haltinwanger
(1990). Using ﬁrm-level data, they document signiﬁcant amounts of JC and JD ﬂows co-
existing in all phases of the cycle and a lot of heterogeneity among plants. A number of
7In Spain, ﬁrms are allowed to dismiss workers for “disciplinary” or “objective” (economic) reasons. The
dismissal cost for objective reasons involves a notice period or 30 days’ wages, plus 20 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a maximum of 12 monthly wages. If the worker does not agree, he has the right to sue the
case to the court. Before going to court, the ﬁrm and the worker usually try to reach an agreement at the
Units of Intermediation (MAC’s). If an agreement is reached, ﬁring costs are the sum of procedural wages,
the agreed severance pay and the consultancy costs. If no agreement is reached at the MAC’s, the judge
decides about the case. If the dismissal is declared fair, ﬁring costs are the sum of the legal costs (20 days’
wages per year of seniority with a maximum of 12 monthly wages), plus the consultancy costs. If, on the
contrary, the dismissal is declared unfair, the costs are the procedural wages, the legal costs (45 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a maximum of 42 monthly wages), plus the consultancy costs. If the dismissal is
declared null, the ﬁrm must readmit the worker and pay the consultancy costs plus the procedural wages.
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empirical studies have applied the same methodology to some European countries: Boeri
and Cramer (1993) for Germany, Contini and Revelli (1987) for Italy, Konings (1995) for the
United Kingdom (UK), Dolado and G´ omez (1995), Garc´ ıa-Serrano and Jimeno (1998) and
Ruano (2000) for Spain, ﬁnding very similar rates of JR across economies despite signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in institutions.
At the same time, a number of theoretical studies have been developed trying to rational-
ize these facts. The most important contribution is the stochastic endogenous job creation
and destruction model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), in which the exogenous JD rate
in the classic search and matching model by Pissarides (1990) is endogenized. For the EU,
the relevant models are those that relate the behavior of JC and JD to the degree of employ-
ment protection. Most of them are of the search and matching type, for instance Garibaldi
(1998), Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b), and Garibaldi and
Violante (2002). Others are in the tradition of the real business cycle literature, for instance,
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), D´ iaz and Gald´ on-S´ anchez (1999) that applies that model
to the Spanish economy, but without introducing the dual structure characteristic of the
Spanish labor market, and Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) that extends that model to an
economy with frictions and absence of insurance contracts. There are also models in the
eﬃciency wage tradition, such as Guell (1999) and Saint-Paul (1996). Finally, Ljungqvist
(2002) explains why all those general equilibrium models with layoﬀ costs have delivered
mixed messages on the implications for employment.
These models with layoﬀ costs might be appropriate for most EU countries, but not for
an economy like the Spanish one, where one third of the contracts has temporary nature.
Thus, a complementary strand of literature is one that focuses on the consequences of the
introduction of TC’s on turnover, employment, productivity and wages. Most of these studies
analyze the Spanish case because of its singularity and tend to relate the existence of TC’s and
the dismissal costs associated to PC’s. For instance, the matching model of Wasmer (1999),
the partial equilibrium demand models of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Cabrales and
Hopenhayn (1997), the collective bargaining models of Bentolila and Dolado (1994) and
7
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Jimeno and Toharia (1993), the eﬃciency wage model of Guell (2000), the dynamic partial
equilibrium demand model of Aguirregaribia and Alonso-Borrego (1999) and the general
equilibrium model of Alonso-Borrego, Fernandez-Villaverde, and Gald´ on-S´ anchez (2002).
Probably, the most similar to ours are Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002) and Hernanz, Jimeno, and Kluger (2003). Blanchard and Landier (2002) and
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), using diﬀerent models, ﬁnd that the liberalization of TC’s
is ineﬃcient in order to reduce unemployment if there is no simultaneous reduction in ﬁring
costs associated to PC’s. Blanchard and Landier (2002) use a matching model to study
the eﬀects on unemployment, unemployment duration, turnover, productivity and welfare.
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) focus on the eﬀects on unemployment, job destruction, tem-
porary employment, welfare and income distribution. Hernanz, Jimeno, and Kluger (2003)
use a version of Blanchard and Landier (2002) model, in which they introduce social security
contributions and endogenous job destruction, and ﬁnd a moderately elastic response of PC’s
to non-wage labor costs.
Our model diﬀers from these 3 models in the following. First, these models are not
appropriate to talk about labor force adjustments primarily made with TC’s vs. PC’s due
to low productivity matches, but about TC’s used as a screening device. Second, we model
ﬁring costs as a transfer from the ﬁrm to the worker instead of as a pure waste tax. Third,
minimum wage constraints are introduced to avoid ﬁring costs’ neutrality. Fourth, the model
is much more structural, that is, we can keep track of contracts and compute distributions by
type of contract of JC and JD, wages, tenure and employment loss by reason of separation
(TC’s reaching the maximum duration allowed, low productivity or retirement). Finally,
the calibration exercise is performed in a very detailed manner. Since none of the above
mentioned models look appropriate to answer the question we pose and to account for the
facts in which we are interested, the ﬁrst goal in this paper is to build a model that has




The economy consists of a continuum of workers with unit mass and a continuum of ﬁrms.
Workers can either be employed or unemployed8. Unemployed workers look for employment
opportunities; employed workers produce and do not search on the job. Firms post vacancies
or produce. There is a cost associated to posting a vacancy, c. Posting a vacancy is not job
creation, unless it is ﬁlled. Each ﬁrm is a one-job ﬁrm and the job might be occupied and
producing or vacant. We assume free entry.
The source of heterogeneity is due to the existence of matchings with diﬀerent quality
levels, durations, and ﬁring costs that depend on previous match quality. Therefore, the
state space that describes the situation of a particular worker is S = {{0,1}×E×D ×E} ,
where E = { 1,..., n} is a discrete set for the quality levels and D = {d1,...,dN} is also a
discrete set denoting tenure on a particular job. Therefore, each quadruple indicates whether
the worker is unemployed (0) or employed (1) and, in that case, the quality of the match,
worker’s tenure and his previous match quality.
4.2 Preferences
Workers have identical preferences, live inﬁnitely and maximize their utility, which is taken
to be linear in consumption. We assume that they supply work inelastically, that is, they
will accept every opportunity that arises. Thus, each worker has preferences deﬁned by
∞
t=1 β
tct, where β,0≤ β<1, is the discount factor and ct is consumption. Firms are also
risk neutral.
8We do not considered other labor market states out of the labor force
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4.3 Technologies
There are two technologies in this economy: a production and a matching technology.
Production technology
Each job is characterized by an irreversible technology and produces one unit of a diﬀer-
entiated product per period, whose price is y( t), where { t} is an idiosyncratic component,
i.e. the quality of the match. This idiosyncratic component is modelled as a stationary
and ﬁnite Markov chain. This process is the same for every matching and the realizations
 t+1 are independent and identically distributed with conditional transition probabilities
Γ(  | )=Pr{ t+1| t}, where  ,    ∈E= {1,2,...,n }. Each new matching starts with the
same entry level  e and from this initial condition, the quality of the match will evolve
stochastically due to these idiosyncratic shocks. We assume that agents know the law of
motion of the process and observe their realizations at the beginning of the period.
Matching technology
Every job is created as a temporary job. In each period, vacancies and unemployed
workers are stochastically matched. We assume the existence of an homogeneous of degree
one matching function m = m(ut,v t), increasing and concave in both arguments, where vt
is the number of vacancies and ut the number of unemployed workers, both normalized by
the ﬁxed labor force. Given the properties of the matching function, the transition rates
for vacancies, q, and unemployment, α, depend only on ν = v/u, a measure of tightness in
the labor market. The vacancy transition rate, q, is deﬁned as the probability of ﬁlling a
vacancy and the transition rate for unemployed workers, α, is deﬁned as the probability of















On the other hand, permanent jobs are created when ﬁrms decide to convert a TC into
a PC. This can be motivated by a good realization of the process { t} at the end of the
10
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maximum period that a contract can last. In particular, job conversion will take place for
realizations above a speciﬁc threshold that ﬁrms determine.
4.4 Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium used is the recursive equilibrium. In each period, the aggregate
state of the economy is described by µ, which represents the matching distribution by quality
levels, tenure on the job and previous quality levels. In the following, I will describe ﬁrms
and workers problems. Note that job destruction will not be eﬃcient in this context, in
the sense that ﬁrms will unilaterally decide upon match continuation (see Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999a) for a discussion).
4.4.1 Firms’ Problems
The vector of states at the beginning of a period for a ﬁrm with a permanent job is ( , −1,µ),
and its problem the following
J
p( , −1,µ)=max{y( ) − w( , −1,µ)+β

  
Γ(  | )J
p(  , ,µ ),
−cf( −1) − c + βq(µ )J
t( e,d 1,µ )+β(1 − q(µ ))J
0(µ )}
s.t. µ  = G(µ)
where Jp( , −1,µ) is the ﬁrm value function, w( , −1,µ) is the wage, previously deter-
mined in a bilateral negotiation between the ﬁrm and the worker or ﬁxed by a minimum wage
when binding, cf( −1) is the ﬁring cost that depends on previous match quality, Jt( e,d 1,µ  )
is the value function of a ﬁrm with a ﬁrst period temporary job, J0(µ )i st h ev a l u eo fa
vacancy and the function G(µ ) describes the law of motion of the distribution. The decision
rule for this ﬁrm is denoted by gp( , −1,µ). The ﬁrm must decide whether to continue with
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the actual match, gp( , −1,µ) = 1, or whether to ﬁre the worker and look for a new one,
gp( , −1,µ)=0 .
Note that the problem is diﬀerent for a ﬁrm whose TC reached the maximum duration
allowed at the end of the previous period. Let us denote by n the maximum number of
periods that a TC can last. In this case, the vector of states at the beginning of the period
is ( ,dn+1,µ), where dn+1 indicates that if the worker is not ﬁred at the beginning of this
period, this worker will start this period as a permanent worker. His previous quality level
is not part of the state vector yet because the ﬁring cost at the beginning of this period is
still zero. The problem of this ﬁrm can be written as9
J
p( ,dn+1,µ)=max{y( ) − w( ,dn+1,µ)+β

  
Γ(  | )J
p(  , ,µ ),
−c + βq(µ )J
t( e,d 1,µ )+β(1 − q(µ ))J
0(µ )}
s.t. µ  = G(µ)
and its decision rule is gp( ,dn+1,µ) = 1 if the ﬁrm converts the TC into a PC and
gp( ,dn+1,µ) = 0 if the ﬁrm decides to ﬁre the worker and start looking for another one.
The vector of states at the beginning of the period of a ﬁrm with a temporary job is
( ,d,µ), where d represents tenure on the contract at the beginning of the period. Note that
the previous quality level is not part of the state vector, since ﬁring costs are zero for this
type of contracts. The problem of this ﬁrm is
9This equation plays the same role as the asset pricing equation of the initial value of the match in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a), where the initial wage is lower because termination costs are not incurred
if no match is formed initially but must be paid if an existing match is destroyed.
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J
t( ,d,µ)=max{y( ) − w( ,d,µ)+β

  
Γ(  | )J
t(  ,d+1 ,µ ),
−c + βq(µ )J
t( e,d 1,µ )+β(1 − q(µ ))J
0(µ )}
s.t. µ  = G(µ)a n dd = {d1,...,dn−1}
where Jt( ,d,µ) is the value function for this ﬁrm and w( ,d,µ) the wage, previously
determined in a bilateral negotiation between the ﬁrm and the worker or ﬁxed by a minimum
wage. The ﬁrm must decide whether to continue with the match, gt( ,d,µ) = 1, or to ﬁre
the worker and look for another one, gt( ,d,µ) = 0. Note that due to the limited duration
of TC’s, the problem of a ﬁrm with a TC at the beginning of the last period (period n)i s
J
t( ,dn,µ)=max{y( ) − w( ,dn,µ)+β

  
Γ(  | )J
p(  ,d n+1,µ
 ),
−c + βq(µ )J
t( e,d 1,µ )+β(1 − q(µ ))J
0(µ )}
s.t. µ  = G(µ)
4.4.2 Workers’ Problems
The problem of a worker in a permanent job is trivial. In fact, his decision is indirect since
he negotiates with the ﬁrm over the wage before the ﬁrm decides upon his continuation.
Similarly, V p( , −1,µ) is the worker’s value function, ˜ Φ(x) is an indicator function that takes
the value 1 if the assessment is true and zero otherwise, and V 0(µ) is the value function for
an unemployed worker.
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V
p( , −1,µ)=˜ Φ(g
p =1 ) [ w( , −1,µ)+β

  
Γ(  | )V
p(  , ,µ )] +
˜ Φ(g
p =0 ) [ V
0(µ)+cf( −1)]
The problem of a worker in a temporary job is also trivial. As before, V t( ,d,µ) is the
value function of a worker in a TC.
V t( ,d,µ)=˜ Φ(gt =1 ) [ w( ,d,µ)+β

   Γ(  | )V t(  ,d+1 ,µ )] + ˜ Φ(gt =0 ) V 0(µ)
Finally, unemployed workers look for employment and accept a job whenever an oppor-
tunity arises. The value function of an unemployed worker is
V 0(µ)=b + βq(µ )V t( e,d 1,µ )+β(1 − α(µ ))V 0(µ )
where V t( e,d 1,µ  ) is the value function of a temporary worker in his ﬁrst period of
contract. The parameter b can be interpreted in two ways. It could be some kind of unem-
ployment subsidy or the return to home production.
4.4.3 Wage determination
Wages are the result of a bilateral bargaining between the worker and the ﬁrm, unless the
legally imposed minimum wage is binding10. Bargaining is dynamic, that is, wages are
revised every period upon occurrence of new shocks. The assumption of bilateral bargaining
is reasonable due to existence of sunk costs (search costs) once the match is produced. This
creates local monopoly power and generates a surplus to be split among the participants in
the match. This surplus, in the case of a permanent contract, is deﬁned as
Sp( , −1,µ)=[ Jp( , −1,µ) − (J0(µ) − cf( −1))] + [V p( , −1,µ) − (V 0(µ)+cf( −1))]
10The downward wage rigidity is modelled as a lower bound on the outcome of wage negotiations. As we
will show in Section 7, we need to impose a minimum wage in order to avoid too much internalization.
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Wages are obtained by maximizing the following Nash product with respect to the wage
and set so that the surplus of the match, Sp( , −1,µ), is split in ﬁxed proportions according
to θ, which reﬂects worker’s bargaining power.
[Jp( , −1,µ) − (J0(µ) − cf( −1))]1−θ[V p( , −1,µ) − (V 0(µ)+cf( −1))]θ
Wages associated to TC’s are obtained by maximizing a similar expression, where cf( −1)=0.
4.4.4 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium is a list of value functions Jp( , −1,µ), Jp( ,dn+1,µ), Jt( ,d,µ),
V p( , −1,µ), V p( ,dn+1,µ), V t( ,d,µ), J0(µ), V 0(µ), transition rates q(µ), α(µ), prices
w( , −1,µ), w( ,d,µ), decision rules gp( , −1,µ), gp( ,dn+1,µ), gt( ,d,µ), and a law of mo-
tion for the aggregate state G(µ ) such that11
1. Optimality: Given functions q(µ), α(µ), w( , −1,µ)a n dw( ,d,µ), the value functions
Jp( , −1,µ), Jp( ,dn+1,µ),Jt( ,d,µ), V p( , −1,µ), V p( ,dn+1,µ)a n dV t( ,d,µ) satisfy
the Bellman equations.
2. Free entry: This condition and the proﬁt maximization condition guarantee that in
equilibrium the number of vacancies adjust to eliminate all rents associated to holding
a vacancy; that is, J0(µ) = 0, implying c = βq(µ )Jt( e,d 1,µ  )
3. Wage bargaining: The equilibrium conditions from maximizing the surplus are
(1 − θ)Sp( , −1,µ)=Jp( , −1,µ)+cf( −1)
θSp( , −1,µ)=V p( , −1,µ) − (V 0(µ)+cf( −1))
11Cole and Rogerson (1999) show that there always exists an equilibrium where wages do not depend on the
unemployment rate, only on the idiosyncratic shock. The intuition is that, because of the free entry margin,
vacancies adjust to the number of unemployed and the relevant variable becomes the ratio of unemployed
workers to vacancies.
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4. Rational expectations: Individual decisions generate a distribution over tomorrow’s
aggregate state that is equivalent to the distribution implied by G(µ ).
5 Mapping the Model to Data
In this section we explain the procedure we use to assign values to the parameters of the
model and the selection of functional forms. The calibration consists on assigning values to
parameters such that the model economy is able to replicate certain statistics of the real data.
For the parameters that have a clear counterpart in the real economy we use the implied
values. For the rest, we prefer not to use arbitrary estimations and we use the simulated
method of moments. This optimization method consists in ﬁnding the values that minimize
the distance between the statistics of the model economy and those of the real data.
5.1 Model period and ﬁrm-level data
The JC and JD statistics have been taken from Ruano (2000), who uses the survey ”Encuesta
sobre Estrategias Empresariales”, a ﬁrm-level annual data set covering the period 1990-97.
The model period has been chosen such that it is consistent with this data and reasonable
from a computational point of view. Hence, we have chosen a year.
5.2 Preferences
The utility function is linear in consumption as usual in this literature. The value of the
discount factor β is ﬁxed such that it is consistent with the mean annual real interest rate
in the reference period, 6%. Therefore, the implied β is 0.94.
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5.3 Production technology
The production function is assumed to be linear in the idiosyncratic shock, y( )= .T h e
idiosyncratic shock is modelled as a Markov chain, Γ[(  )|( )]. In addition, we assume that
there are ﬁve possible quality levels. In general, this two assumptions would imply that
we need to impose 20 restrictions to ﬁx the values of the conditional transition probabili-
ties between diﬀerent quality levels, unless we assume that the expected duration of good
idiosyncratic and bad idiosyncratic shocks coincide. This would imply that, for instance,
Γ[( 1)|( 2)] = Γ[( 2)|( 1)] and, therefore, we would only need to estimate 15 transition prob-
abilities. Given that we do not have direct information on the quality of the match, we use
Tauchen’s procedure12 to parameterize the ﬁve quality match levels, as well as the transition
probabilities. To apply this procedure we need to know the mean (µ), standard deviation
(σv) and autocorrelation coeﬃcient ( ρ) of the underlying idiosyncratic process. We use
quarterly GDP in the period 1990-1996 to approximate that process.
5.4 Unemployment beneﬁts
The parameter b can be given two interpretations, the return to household production or the
value of unemployment beneﬁts. Since we do not have good information about the ﬁrst, we
use the second interpretation. But instead of ﬁxing the value of b, we ﬁx the ratio of average
unemployment beneﬁts to the minimum wage, b/wmin. To compute this ratio we use the
following pieces of information13: unemployment beneﬁts in Spain in 1996 were about 540
Euro a month and coverage 0.3. We can consider average monthly unemployment pay as the
product of the two, that is, 162 Euro a month. On the other hand, the monthly minimum
wage in 1996 was 390.18 Euro. These two observations generate a ratio b/wmin of 0.41.
12See Tauchen (1986)
13The source for this data is Bulletin of Labour Statistics edited by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Aﬀairs, the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA), and National Employment Oﬃce (INEM) Statistics.
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5.5 Matching technology
The matching function m = m(vt,u t) is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas homogeneous of
degree one function, m = m(v,u)=A∗vη(u)1−η. The scale parameter A reﬂects the degree
of mismatch in the economy and η is the value of the elasticity of the number of matches
with respect to vacancies.
In sum, the calibration exercise involves the assignment of values to two types of param-
eters. The discount rate and the parameters of the idiosyncratic process are the only ones
that are set independently of the rest since they have clear counterparts in the real econ-
omy. The six remaining parameters: the cost of opening a vacancy c, the elasticity of new
matches with respect to the vacancy input η, the scale parameter in the matching function
A, workers bargaining power θ, unemployment beneﬁts b, and the minimum wage wmin are
obtained using the method of simulated moments. We need to impose six conditions to set
these six parameters. The conditions that we impose are the following
1. The ratio b/wmin is 0.41 as explained before.
2. The distribution of temporary job destruction is: 0.15 percent of temporary employ-
ment losses are due to productivity reasons and 0.85 are due to the end of the maximum
duration allowed14.
3. The distribution of permanent job destruction is: 0.38 percent of permanent employ-
ment losses are due to productivity reasons and 0.62 are due to retirement15.
4. Two statistics related to the tenure distribution: 51% of employment has a tenure of
less than ﬁve years and 66% less than ten years16.
14Author self–calculations using the data from the “Spanish Labor Force Survey” 1990-96.
15Author self–calculations using the data from the “Spanish Labor Force Survey” 1990-96.
16See Table 5.5 “Distribution of employment by employer tenure, 1995” in Employment Outlook 1997
edited by the OECD.
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Table 2: Baseline Economy Parameters.
βµ ρ σ v bw min Aηcθf
.94 .03 .75 .11 .10 .25 .50 .50 .15 .45 1.2
5. The share of aggregate consumption in output is assumed to be 0.85. In the model,
aggregate consumption is the output generated by ﬁrms plus unemployment beneﬁts
less the costs of oﬀering vacancies in the market.
The optimization procedure generates the six parameters values related to these statistics
(see Table 2). Previous studies have used values for c in the range [0.2 − 0.3] and the
bargaining parameter has been set to 0.5 because of lack of information. Abowd and Lemieux
(1993) estimate a value 0.3f o rθ. The value for η is congruent with the range [0.4 − 0.6]
obtained in empirical studies.
5.6 Firing costs
To compute the equilibrium we need a ﬁring cost function that reﬂects the average ﬁring cost
in the real economy for the period under study. We use the following pieces of information
for 1996 to estimate the ﬁring cost function: legal indemnities17 for fair (20 days’ wages per
year of seniority with a maximum of 12 monthly wages) and unfair (45 days’ of wages per
year of seniority with a maximum of 42 monthly wages) dismissals, mean tenure of around
9y e a r s 18, procedural wages of around two month wages, and the fact that 72% of all ﬁring
processes were declared unfair.
17In 1996 most dismissals were sued: 79% of them agreed at MAC’s, and from the rest only 15% were
ﬁnally judged. The precise number of days actually agreed is not known (only the amounts paid), but the
presumption is that they are very close to the legal limit. Therefore, we focus on legal indemnities following
Toharia (1999) and Malo (2002).
18See Table 5.5 “Distribution of employment by employer tenure, 1995” in Employment Outlook 1997
edited by the OECD.
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Using those observations, ﬁring a permanent worker with a 9-year tenure amounts to 402
days of salary (including procedural wages). Since w refers to an annual wage, cf =1 .1∗w−1
would be the implied ﬁring cost function. Given an monthly before-tax wage of around 1082
Euro 19, that ﬁring cost function implies an indemnity of 12.118 Euro. According to Bentolila
(1997), the average indemnity reported in the “Bulletin of Labor Statistics” lied in the range
[6.460 − 14.430] Euro, depending on whether indemnities were agreed at the MAC’s or
imposed by the judge, but in his opinion they should not be that diﬀerent20. Thus, we think
that [1−1.3] is a reasonable range for parameter f and f =1 .2 will be used in the baseline.
Note that legal ﬁring costs depend on the previous wage. Since making the ﬁring cost
function depend on previous wages is computationally very diﬃcult to manage, we take the
previous quality of the match as an approximation of the previous wage and use the following
general functional form cf = f ∗  −1.
6 Main Findings
In this section we report the answers to the questions that we posed. In Section 6.1, we
report the results of the calibration exercise to test whether the baseline model is a good
starting point to make counterfactual experiments. In Section 6.2, we show the eﬀects of the
elimination of procedural wages. In Section 6.3, we report the results of larger reductions in
ﬁring costs.
6.1 Calibration results
We can distinguish two kinds of statistics: those that are used to match the economy,
and those over which we want to ask questions. The model has been calibrated to match
19Source: Bolet´ ın Mensual de Estad´ ıstica (INE).
20Bentolila (1997) argues that there is an upward bias in the indemnities agreed at MAC’s because they
may be capturing, not only the indemnities, but also procedural wages and the ﬁnal discharge. On the
other hand, the indemnities imposed by the judge are subject to other biases, i.e., a downward bias because
indemnities are not always reported in the statistical questionnaires.
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Table 3: Calibration results.
Statistics Simulated Model Spanish Data
b/wmin .40 .41
JDt− prod .19 .15
JDp− prod .33 .38
tenure < 5 .44 .51
tenure < 10 .75 .66
C/Y .81 .85
the following set of statistics: the ratio of unemployment beneﬁts to the minimum wage
(b/wmin), the temporary (JDt− prod) and permanent (JDp− prod) job destruction rates
due to productivity reasons, the less than 5-years tenure employment rate (tenure < 5),
the less than 10-years tenure employment rate (tenure < 10) and the share of aggregate
consumption in output (C/Y). On the other hand, the set of statistics in which we are
interested are: the permanent job destruction rate (JDp), the temporary job destruction
rate (JDt), the temporary employment rate (temp), the rate of conversions from temporary
into permanent jobs (conver), the unemployment rate (u − rate), unemployment duration
(u−dur) and the wage gap. We focus on JD rates instead of JC rates for two reasons. First,
in steady-state they should be the same. And second, focusing in JC is tricky because there
are important diﬀerences between the process of permanent job creation in this model and
in the real economy: (i) permanent job creation is only possible via conversion of TC’s into
PC’s, and (ii) given the model assumptions, ﬁrms do not have incentives to convert these
contracts prior to the n period of the TC21.
Table 3 shows that the baseline model is a good starting point to ask questions about the
21To compute the statistics we have generated series of unemployment rates, job creation and destruc-
tion rates (aggregate and disaggregate by type of contract), temporary employment rates, job conversion
rates, wage and consumption shares, distributions of temporary job destruction rates by reason of separation
(productivity or TC-max-duration), distributions of permanent job destruction rates by reason of separa-
tion (productivity or retirement) and distributions of employment tenure in temporary and in permanent
contracts. Since all variables are stationary, it is not necessary to detrend the series to make the calculations.
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Table 4: Simulation results.





u − rate .18 .20
u − dur 1.63 1.4
wage− gap .24 [ .1-.47]
workings of this economy because it matches real data quite well. Table 4 shows the other
set of statistics. The baseline model is able to reproduce the means of job destruction by
type of contract, the temporary employment rate, the unemployment rate and the duration
of unemployment 22 reasonable well. However, the share of temporary employment and the
job conversion rate23 are a little bit high when compared to the actual data.
The behavior of wages deserves comments. The existence of two types of workers, per-
manent workers protected by EPL and temporary workers not protected at all, implies that,
in some sense, this is an insider-outsider model, where wages are going to be diﬀerent for the
two types of workers. In particular, wages for permanent workers, not only depend on the
actual match quality level, but also on the previous quality of the match through its eﬀect
on ﬁring costs: the higher the previous quality of the match, the higher the ﬁring costs, and
so the higher the actual negotiated wage. Moreover, one would expect that the wage be a
positive function of the actual quality level, for any particular value of the previous match
quality. This is not always true in this model due to the way wages are determined. For
22The Spanish average unemployment duration has been computed considering the following distribution
of the duration of unemployment in 1996: 28% of the unemployed have been looking for employment less
than 6 months, 19% between 6 and 12 months and 53% more than 12 months. Source: European Union
Bulletin 7/8-1997.
23The job conversion rate has been taken from Toharia (1998).
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suﬃciently high ﬁring costs, wages are not increasing in match quality since ﬁrms antici-
pate that future ﬁring costs will be higher the higher the previous quality of the match and
therefore, push down wages when bargaining.
On the other hand, wages for workers in TC’s do not depend on the previous quality of
the match. They are just an increasing function of match quality. What is very interesting
is the evolution of wages when going from a TC to a PC. In the benchmark case, wages in
PC’s are 24% higher than wages in TC’s24, except for the ﬁrst-period wage in a PC, which
internalizes future ﬁring costs, and therefore may be even lower than the wage of a temporary
worker in a job with the same match quality.25 Of course, minimum wage provisions will not
always make it possible to fully internalize future ﬁring costs. In that case, as we will see in
Section 7, the negative eﬀects of ﬁring costs on employment will be higher.
6.2 Eﬀects of the elimination of procedural wages
The elimination of procedural wages implies a 17% reduction in ﬁring costs26, which implies
going from f =1 .2 (ﬁring costs with procedural wages) to f = 1 (ﬁring costs without
procedural wages). The main results are shown in Table 5.
The elimination of procedural wages increases permanent job destruction because now
it is less costly to ﬁre permanent workers. However, the main eﬀect is the increase in
job conversions, as in Hernanz, Jimeno, and Kluger (2003), where they ﬁnd a moderately
response of permanent employment to non-wage labor costs and a signiﬁcant increase in the
transitions from TC’s to PC’s. Lower ﬁring costs increase the incentives to convert TC’s
into PC’s because doing so allows ﬁrms to avoid turnover costs and, in case of dismissal due
24OECD (2002) reports that average wage in a TC lags that of a PC by 13% in Britain, 17% in Germany,
20% in France and 47% in Spain. According to Jimeno and Toharia (1993) the wage gap is 10% in Spain.
25Frisen (1996) using Canadian data ﬁnds that incumbent workers, protected by these regulations, extract
higher wages than those of not protected workers, and that starting wages (for non-union workers) appear
to fall to oﬀset subsequent wage increases.
26Procedural wages are around 57 − 65% of the total ﬁring cost for a one-year tenure contract; 21 − 27%
for a ﬁve-year tenure contract; and 11 − 15% for a ten-to-ﬁfteen-year tenure contract.
23
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Table 5: Elimination of procedural wages.
Statistics cf =1 .2 cf =1 %var %var
%f
JDp .10 .11 4.52 -0.27
JDt .18 .14 -22.91 1.37
temp .37 .34 -10.71 0.74
conver .15 .19 26.67 -1.6
u − rate .18 .15 -17.5 1.06
dur − u 1.63 1.57 -3.68 0.22
JDt− prod .19 .26 36.84 -2.21
JDp− prod .33 .35 5.66 -.34
wage− gap .24 .20 -16.67 1.00
to bad productivity shocks, ﬁring costs are lower than in the baseline.
In fact, most of the reduction in the temporary job destruction rate is due to the increase
in job conversions, which implies less temporary job destruction due TC’s reaching the
maximum duration allowed and not being renewed. This can best understood if we look
at the eﬀects on the distribution of temporary job destruction by reason of separation: the
ﬁring costs reduction lowers the proportion of temporary jobs destroyed due to TC’s reaching
the maximum duration allowed because more TC’s are converted, while the proportion of
temporary jobs destroyed due to productivity reasons increases despite the decrease in the
productivity threshold that governs temporary job destruction. On the other hand, the
distribution of permanent employment loss remains almost unchanged.
Concerning the behavior of wages, the elimination of procedural wages decreases the
wage gap by 17% because permanent workers lose bargaining power and, as consequence,
their wages get reduced. Finally, the temporary employment rate and the unemployment
rate both fall by a 0.74% and 1%, respectively, relative to the 1% change in ﬁring costs. The
unemployment rate falls because the increase in job creation through job conversions more
than compensate the increase in job destruction due to ﬁring costs being lower.
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6.3 Eﬀects of lowering ﬁring costs
In Table 6 we show the results for several values of parameter f going from the baseline
value, f =1 .2, to the extreme case in which ﬁring costs are nil, f = 0. First, lowering
ﬁring costs a bit more, further increases permanent job destruction, which is consistent with
theoretical predictions, in the sense that, lower ﬁring costs should make the dismissal of
permanent workers easier.
Second, temporary job destruction decreases, not only due to the increase in job conver-
sions as before, but also due to the lower duality in the labor market; that is, job destruction
due to negative productivity shocks tends to be less concentrated in temporary employment
as ﬁring costs further decrease.
Third, the behavior of the share of temporary employment deserves some comments.
From the obtained results, one could think that this share should be positively related to the
degree of EPL because the lower the ﬁring costs, the more job conversion there is, and so the
lower the share of temporary employment. However, this need not be the case because the
share of temporary employment is aﬀected, not only by the behavior of the job conversion
rate, but also by the permanent job destruction rate. And the permanent job destruction
rate is also higher as it gets cheaper to ﬁre. Note that all these ﬁred workers must go
through unemployment and then through a temporary job to be back to work. Thus, the
ﬁnal eﬀect on the share of temporary employment depends on which of the two eﬀects, the
increase in permanent job creation (through job conversions) or the increase in permanent
job destruction dominate.
Fourth, the non–monotonous behavior of the distribution of temporary job destruction
also deserves a comment. One would expect a positive relation between the degree of EPL
and temporary job destruction due to productivity shocks as job destruction tends to be less
concentrated in temporary employment. However, the decrease in ﬁring costs also reduces
temporary job destruction due to TC’s reaching the maximum duration allowed, because of
the increase in job conversions, so that the ﬁnal distributional eﬀect depends on which of
25
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Table 6: Lowering ﬁring costs.
Statistics cf =1 .2 cf =1 cf = .5 cf =0
JDp .10 .11 .14 .15
JDt .18 .14 .11 .05
temp .37 .34 .33 .31
conver .15 .19 .22 .24
u − rate .18 .15 .18 .16
dur − u 1.63 1.57 1.72 1.70
JDt− prod .19 .26 .29 .23
JDp− prod .33 .35 .62 .65
wage− gap .24 .20 .09 0
the two eﬀects is higher.
Fifth, the eﬀect on unemployment is ambiguous, as in Hernanz, Jimeno, and Kluger
(2003) because there is more job creation, but there is also more job destruction. Lowering
ﬁring costs reduces the diﬀerence between the conversion and the dismissal productivity
threshold for permanent jobs, both because the conversion threshold falls and because the
dismissal threshold increases, so that the net eﬀect on unemployment is ambiguous. Finally,
the wage gap collapses to zero when ﬁring costs are null. As ﬁring costs decrease, wages
of workers in PC’s get lower while those of workers in TC’s get higher due to changes in
bargaining power; that is, ﬁring cost regulations makes the wage proﬁle steeper.
7 Robustness
In this section we explore whether the ﬁndings of the previous sections are speciﬁc to the
baseline model economy or also hold for some variations of the model. In Section 7.1 we look
at alternative values for the parameter wmin. This is very important because the combined
eﬀect of these two institutions, EPL and minimum wages, has often been blamed for the lack
of ﬂexibility and poor performance of European labor markets. Section 7.2 looks at what
26
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Table 7: Elim. of proc. wages with wmin =0 .3
Statistics cf =1 .2 cf =1 %var %var
%f
JDp .14 .15 3.43 -.17
JDt .27 .19 -29.0 1.45
temp .55 .45 -18.2 1.09
conver .10 .14 35.0 -2.1
u − rate .28 .23 -19.3 -.96
dur − u 1.83 1.78 -2.72 .14
JDt− prod .28 .39 39.3 -1.96
JDp− prod .67 .69 .04 -.20
the ﬁndings would have been without the minimum wage constraint27.
7.1 Higher minimum wage
We want to see whether a increase in wmin do alter results in a signiﬁcant way, basically
in terms of elasticities; levels do not convey much information because this version is not
calibrated since the idea is to have the same conﬁguration of parameters than in the baseline
except for the value of wmin.
As in Section 6.2, the elimination of procedural wages leaves permanent job destruction
almost unchanged, and reduces temporary job destruction and increases job conversion by
a large extent (see Table 7). Comparing elasticities, a 1% reduction in ﬁring costs reduces
temporary job destruction by a similar magnitude, 1.45% (1.37% in the previous case),
increases job conversion by 2.1% (1.6% in the baseline), and decreases the share of temporary
employment accordingly by 1.14% (0.74% before). Also, the unemployment rate experiences
a very similar change: it falls by .96% (1.06% in the baseline).
Regarding wages, those of temporary workers are much higher than in the baseline,
27We have also performed other robustness exercises (not reported here) considering the other parameters
of the model. None of them show signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to the baseline.
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces28
than those of permanent workers because wage constraints are more binding. This higher
minimum wage tends to compress the wage distribution, and as a consequence, there is less
scope for ﬁring costs internalization.
It is interesting to compare the levels of these variables with the corresponding levels
in the baseline (see again Table 5 and Table 7). Note that now both, permanent and
temporary job destruction are much higher than in Section 6.2, being the only diﬀerence the
higher minimum wage. Also the temporary employment rate and the unemployment rate are
much higher. On the contrary, job conversion is lower and unemployment duration larger.
Basically, every statistic performs worse than in the baseline because the higher minimum
wage constraints ﬁrms more: they destroy jobs at a greater rate and they have less incentives
to create permanent jobs.
In sum, this exercise supports the idea that the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on unemployment and
other labor market variables depends very much on the level of wage rigidities and that these
two institutions combined might be to a large extent responsible for the poor performance
of European labor markets28.
7.2 Without minimum wage constraints
In this section we look at what the ﬁndings would have been if no minimum wage constraint
was imposed. In this paper we have assumed that ﬁring costs are transferable from the ﬁrm
to the worker because we are focusing on procedural wages and severance pay. Of course,
in real economies there are also other components of ﬁring costs that are non-transferable
in nature, such as notice, consultancy, readmission, delay. Since Lazear (1990), we know
that if ﬁring costs are transferable, despite legally provisions, ﬁrms and workers can undo
their eﬀects by lowering the wage, so that there would be no eﬀects on employment. This is
actually what happens here. As you can see in Table 8, labor market variables do not change
28Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b) ﬁnd that ﬁring taxes increase employment if wages are ﬂexible down-
wards. This is no longer the case if downward wage adjustment is limited.
28
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Table 8: Elim. of proc. wages without wmin
Statistics cf =1 .2 cf =1 %var %var
%f
JDp .09 .09 0 0
JDt .34 .34 0 0
temp .21 .21 0 0
conver .33 .33 0 0
u − rate .10 .10 0 0
dur − u 1.51 1.51 0 0
JDt− prod 0 0 0 0
JDp− prod 0 0 0 0
after the ﬁring costs reduction since the whole action takes place through wage adjustments.
This compensation cannot take place if there is a minimum wage or any other form of wage
rigidity. The elimination of procedural wages decreases wages of permanent workers instead
of increasing permanent job destruction, except for the ﬁrst-period wage of a PC, which is a
little bit higher since there is less need of internalizing future ﬁring costs. Wages of workers
in temporary contracts remain the same.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have asked what would have been the eﬀects on the relevant labor market
variables, had the Spanish government not revoked (in September 2002) the decree intro-
duced in May 2002 that eliminated procedural wages. The advantage of our approach is the
fact that we can exploit within country variation to disentangle the eﬀects of EPL per se
from the eﬀects of EPL when interacted with other institutions, which the usual drawback
from cross-country studies. This is possible due to the dual character of the Spanish labor
market.
We have quantiﬁed the eﬀects of this 17% ﬁring costs reduction on job creation and
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destruction by type of contract, temporary employment, job conversion, unemployment,
unemployment duration, and on the distributions of tenure, wages and job separations. The
main predictions of this exercise are (i) a small increase on permanent job destruction, (ii)
a signiﬁcant reduction of temporary job destruction mainly driven by the increase in job
conversions, and (iii) a signiﬁcant reduction in labor market segmentation measured as the
reduction in the wage gap of temporary versus permanent workers.
Has this been again a lost opportunity to reduce labor market segmentation? Maybe
not because the situation is not exactly the same as before May 2002. A novelty has been
introduced in September 2002, in the sense that, ﬁrms can avoid having to pay procedural
wages if they admit that the dismissal is unfair and deposit the corresponding legal indemnity
immediately after the dismissal. This way ﬁrms not only avoid procedural wages, but also
the uncertainty and delays that these procedures involve. Moreover, workers do not need to
prove anymore the dismissal through a conciliation act or a judgement in order to get the
indemnity. These two novelties will probably reduce both conciliations and judgements, and
so the need to pay procedural wages29. However, this may not reduce expected ﬁring costs
at all because admitting that the dismissal is unfair from the beginning implies giving up
the possibility that the dismissal is ruled fair, which is much cheaper. The only thing that
has probably changed is the possibility of reducing uncertainty and delays. Since this is not
the focus of the paper we leave this aside. Concluding, the point of this exercise has been to
provide an idea of the quantitative eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring costs in a model economy
that matches the Spanish data reasonable well. This structure can be useful in order to
evaluate possible reforms. In addition, the model is suﬃciently general to incorporate other
institutional details, like social security contributions or to focus in a particular population
group.
29We have tried to ﬁnd evidence of this lower incidence of conciliations and judgements from September
on, but the series provided by the Ministry of Labor are still too short to see any trend. In fact, judgements
in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 are higher than in the last quarter of 2002. Regarding conciliations, the monthly
series from September 2002 does not show any clear trend.
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